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Abstract. The allocation of order flow to alternative trading systems can be
understood as a game with strategic substitutes between buyers on the same
side of the market, as well as one of positive network externalities. We consider
the allocation of order flow between a crossing network and a dealer market and
show that small differences in traders’ preferences generate a unique switching
equilibrium, in which patient traders use the crossing network while impatient
traders submit orders directly to the dealer market. Our model explains why assets
with large turnovers and low price volatility are likely to be traded on crossing
networks, while less liquid assets are traded on dealer markets.
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1. Introduction
Traders who do not require immediate execution of orders can reduce trading costs by
searching for counterparties on alternative trading systems (ATS), instead of going
to traditional dealer markets. New communication technologies and deregulation—
e.g. the EU’s MiFID directive—have fuelled the development of such systems (see
overviews by Degryse [7] or Stoll [28]). Some are sidelines of broker-dealers, and some
are “dark pools” that aim to reveal as little information about trades as possible.
Examples of opaque trading systems are crossing networks, which allow traders to
enter orders that are crossed at a specific time at a price derived from another market.1
Offering lower commission, after-hours trading and anonymity, these systems direct
order flow away from traditional exchanges, reducing transparency and potentially
fragmenting liquidity. The development is of interest to economists, regulators,
investors, and others who closely follow the emergence of new market structures.
A major question is how liquidity will be allocated and under which circumstances
and for which sorts of assets, these alternative markets can emerge, co-exist with
dealer markets or even replace them. It is not immediately obvious whether traders
would keep on using traditional markets if there are cheaper alternatives. However,
one barrier for adoption is that new venues must attract sufficient order flow to
ensure a sufficiently high probability of order execution. When traders choose venues,
strategic complements arise due to the liquidity externality of a deep market. As in
other settings with strategic complements, this may lead to the existence of multiple
equilibria. Previous theoretical research that has explored the issue of competition
between trading venues has suffered from an indeterminacy due to the multiple
equilibria, impeding policy implications. In some equilibria, alternative markets
almost completely replace dealer markets, while in others they fail to attract sufficient
liquidity to be viable.
In this paper, we investigate the allocation of order flow between a traditional
dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN). We contribute to the literature
on the allocation of order flow by removing the multiplicity of equilibria that has
plagued previous models. In our model, trading on a DM guarantees immediate
order execution at bid and ask prices quoted by market makers. Trading on the
electronic market is less expensive, as traders do not have to pay for an intermediary’s
services but only a small commission. However, the execution of an order submitted
is uncertain because the number of buyers and sellers that are active in the market
is ex ante unknown. The allocation of order flow can be understood as a game with
strategic substitutes as well as strategic complements. Strategic substitutes exist
because traders on the same side of a venue compete for orders. But if sufficiently
many buyers and sellers coordinate to trade on a new venue, the probability of
1Examples of crossing networks are Instinet, POSIT, E-Crossnet and XETRA XXL. Degryse, Van
Achter and Wuyts [10] provide an overview of recent market developments.
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order execution is high and expected payoff from trading on this market may exceed
the payoff from trading on a dealer market. We show that the positive network
externalities arising from overall market size dominate the strategic substitutes
induced by competition of orders on the same side, so that one can apply the global
game approach of Carlsson and van Damme [3] and Morris and Shin [22] to derive a
monotonic switching equilibrium.
Heterogeneity is the driving force in our model. Since the two venues differ in
features, they attract different kinds of traders. In our model’s equilibrium, traders
with a strong preference for immediate order execution trade at traditional DMs,
while patient traders prefer submitting orders to a CN, other things equal. Markets
coexist when the CN is sufficiently liquid and there is sufficiently large heterogeneity
of traders, so that some agents are patient and some are not. Traders whose liquidity
preference is below a certain threshold then go to the CN. A unique such threshold
exists, and it is increasing in the liquidity of the market, measured by the expected
number of traders. This allows us to answer the question under which conditions a
CN can coexist with a dealer market and conduct comparative statics.
These features of our model explain why assets with large turnovers and low price
volatility are likely to be traded on crossing networks, while less liquid assets are
traded on dealer markets, as empirical evidence also shows. Using a propriety data
set on trading, Conrad et al. [5] find that CNs attract mostly stocks with large
market capitalisation and high trading volume. Gresse [16] finds that less risky and
more actively traded stocks are more likely to trade on a CN, based on LSE and
Irish stock market data. Mao Yeh [20] studies NSYE and NASDAQ stocks and finds
that the market share of crossing networks is higher for lower volatility stocks and
higher volume. More generally, Theissen [29] reports evidence that market share of
competing electronic trading venues increases with the trading volume of a stock
and is negatively related to return volatility.
Market liquidity is a crucial parameter in our model. When liquidity is low, there
is a substantial risk of mis-coordination by buyers and sellers. The CN becomes a
viable trading venue only if it attracts sufficient liquidity to reduce the coordination
risk. It is something that alternative trading systems have to deal with in reality. For
crossing networks, this coordination risk is strengthened by their opaque character
and potentially low order execution probabilities. Gresse [16] describes how in the
eighties, a first attempt at establishing a European CN, ARIEL, failed to attract
sufficient liquidity. She also documents probabilities of order execution on CNs as
low as 2–4%. Theissen [29] reports that XETRA, after expanding the set of traded
stocks beyond an initial set, reduced its number of auctions due to lack of liquidity.
Several other papers study competition for order flow between a DM and an
alternative market. These papers have one thing in common: there are multiple
equilibria due to the presence of liquidity externalities. This holds in particular for
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the seminal paper by Hendershott and Mendelson [18], who study the impact of
introducing a passive CN on competitive DMs and trading behaviour. The most
plausible equilibria share the property that patient traders use the CN exclusively,
traders with medium liquidity preferences use DMs when their order could not be
matched at the CN, and traders with a strong liquidity preference go to the DM
directly. Glosten [14] examines an idealised electronic limit order book and shows that
it does not invite competition from other markets while other markets do. Parlour
and Seppi [26] present a model of competition for order flow between different pairings
of pure limit order markets and hybrid specialist/limit order markets. Viswanathan
and Wang [31] model a traders’ choice between a limit-order book, a DM, and a
hybrid market structure of the two when traders differ in size and risk aversion.
Chowdhry and Nanda [4] analyse how the ability of traders to choose the trading
venue affects functioning and liquidity of markets in the presence of informational
asymmetries and liquidity traders, who are not allowed to switch to another market.
They show that the market with the largest number of liquidity traders attracts
liquidity and informed traders, resulting in a concentration of trading in this market.
Our paper also complements research that has focused on competition between
trading platforms, but not on the qualitative features that make platforms different
from one another. These models give equilibrium predictions that are considerably
less sharp. Pagano [25] studies a model of competition between markets with identical
features, and shows that they cannot coexist when they charge the same transaction
fee, but may coexist when their transaction fees differ. In this case, there may be
either fragmentation or consolidation of trading, depending on the traders’ initial
expectations about other traders’ decisions where to trade. Ellison and Fudenburg
[11] study a two market model with buyers and sellers which, like ours, exhibits
liquidity externalities as well as strategic substitutes between agents on the same side
of the market. They argue that the latter, which they call traders’ “market impact”,
may discourage traders from switching to the other market, creating a multitude of
stable equilibria with unequal market sizes in which the two markets coexist. By
contrast, our model predicts a unique split of trading activity. In our model, the
liquidity externality and the market impact affects the CN, but not the DM.
Technically related to our model, Gehrig [13] analyses competition between an
intermediary who offers guaranteed execution and a decentralised search market
where heterogeneous traders meet randomly. Search is associated with a lower
probability of order execution. Gehrig shows that traders with a low liquidity
preference choose bilateral trading instead of trading with an intermediary. As in
our model, the probability of order execution at one of the markets is limited, which
is key for the existence of a critical liquidity preference that divides the customers
of the two markets. However, in Gehrig’s model, there is no uncertainty about the
number of active buyers or sellers. Introducing a CN where all buyers and sellers
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can meet, would guarantee multiple equilibria and the execution probability at the
CN would be either zero or one.
Also related is Degryse et al. [9], who analyse the welfare effects of reduced
transparency in a setting with a CN and a DM. They use a sequential structure
with a priori known number of traders who know their position in the sequence of
arrivals. Under these assumptions, the equilibrium can be derived using backward
induction, but this setting is qualitatively different from ours, in which the number
of traders is ex ante unknown and they arrive simultaneously.
Finally, our paper makes a technical contribution to a growing literature that seeks
to relax strict strategic complements assumptions that are typical in global games.
Goldstein and Pauzner [15], Karp et al. [19] and Daniëls et al. [6] study global game
models that exhibit both strategic complements and substitutes. In these models,
actions are complements in some region of the action space and substitutes in others.
By contrast, in our model, actions are complements for some traders, and substitutes
for others.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop a benchmark model in
which positive network externalities arise from the probability of order execution at
a CN, illustrating the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. In Section 3 we introduce
heterogeneity in liquidity preferences and prove that this leads to a unique switching
equilibrium. The uniqueness of the switching equilibrium allows us to do comparative
statics. In Section 4, we present welfare results based on our model’s equilibrium. In
Section 5, we present robustness results, discussing the possible relaxation of some
of the simplifying assumptions of our model. Section 6 concludes.
2. Traders and Markets: A Benchmark Model
Traders choose market venues depending on transaction costs and liquidity, amongst
other things. As more traders direct their orders to a particular venue, liquidity
increases. This, in turn, attracts even more traders—there are positive network
externalities. Because of this feature, the choice of a market venue may be understood
as a coordination game with strategic complements: the difference in expected payoffs
from directing an order to one venue versus another increases in the relative size of
the venue.
This section develops a benchmark model in which traders choose to trade either
at a dealer market or at a crossing network. Our benchmark model is a reduced
form one-shot game, in which unexecuted orders leave the trader with some disutility.
This disutility may arise from traders’ impatience or urgency to trade or from the
risk associated with an asset’s price volatility. Positive network externalities arise
from the fact that the probability of order execution at the crossing network is
increasing in the liquidity directed to this network. As is typical for coordination
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games with strategic complements, our benchmark model has multiple equilibria.
In our benchmark model, trading costs and asset prices are exogenous. Changing
these features typically strengthens the presence of strategic complements, as we will
explain in Section 5.
§2.1. The Model
Consider an asset that trades at a dealer market (DM) and at a crossing network
(CN). A finite, random number of traders is active at each side of the market; the
number of buyers is Nb, the number of sellers is Ns. We assume that Nb and Ns are
independently and identically distributed, and that with strictly positive probability
Nb 6= Ns. Each trader decides to trade at the DM or the CN.
In the DM, traders trade with market makers who set bid and ask prices at which
they are willing to buy or sell the asset. We normalise the mid-point of bid and ask
price to zero, so that traders can buy the asset at price tdm and sell at −tdm, where
tdm is half of the bid-ask spread.
The CN offers transactional services without any intervention by an intermediary.
Orders can be submitted to the CN as market orders and are executed at the mid-
point between the bid and ask price observed on the DM, i.e. zero. Traders who have
submitted to the CN run the risk of their orders not being executed. The numbers of
buyers and sellers who place their orders in the CN, denoted by nb and ns, determine
the probabilities with which orders are executed. If there is an imbalance of orders
on the two sides of the CN, the excess side is rationed stochastically. Orders on
the excess side are then randomly selected to match orders on the short side. The
execution probability of a buy order in the CN is therefore
πb = min{1, ns/nb},
and the execution probability of a sell order is
πs = min{1, nb/ns}.
If an order is executed in the CN, the trader pays a small fee tcn < tdm.
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Since the total numbers of buyers Nb and of sellers Ns are unknown to traders
when they submit their orders, they always face some uncertainty about whether or
not an order at the CN will be executed. Unexecuted orders may be resubmitted
to the market in the next period or passed to a dealer. Either way, trades are
executed with delay and possibly at a different price. We assume that this leaves the
trader with some disutility θ > tcn. We refer to θ as the trader’s liquidity preference:
the higher θ, the more the trader values a liquid market, where orders are quickly
executed.
2This is a feature of some ATS in reality: POSIT, for instance, allows submission of orders free of
charge, charging a fee when orders are executed. Including a submission fee does not change the
results, as a fee for unexecuted orders can be subsumed in θ.
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Let αs be the proportion of sellers that go to the CN, and αb the proportion of
buyers. Given these proportions and a random process that determines the number
of active buyers and sellers, the expected probabilities of order execution are well
defined. Denote the execution probability of a buy order on the CN by π(αb, αs).
By symmetry, the execution probability of a sell order is π(αs, αb). For a buyer the
expected payoff from going to the CN instead of going to the DM is therefore
U(θ, αb, αs) = (θ − tcn)π(αb, αs)− (θ − tdm).
By symmetry, for a seller the expected payoff from going to the CN instead of going
to the DM is
U(θ, αs, αb) = (θ − tcn)π(αs, αb)− (θ − tdm).
§2.2. Geometric Distribution of Arrival
To gain further intuition, we may adopt a specific functional form for the function π.
Consider the geometric distribution adopted by Hendershott and Mendelson (2000),
which arises as follows. With probability p, a first buyer comes to the market. If,
and only if, a first buyer comes to the market, a second buyer comes again with
probability p, and so on. The probability of having at least n buyers is thus pn,
and the total number of buyers Nb follows a geometric distribution with expectation
value E[Nb] = p/(1 − p) =: λ. Sellers come according to the same process. This
parametrisation has the advantage that λ is a measure of the overall thickness of the
market. The following result shows how market thickness affects the probability of
order execution.
Lemma 1. If Nb and Ns are independently drawn from a geometric distribution with








1 + αs λ
)
,
and the execution probability of a sell-order is π(αs, αb) by symmetry.
The proof of this lemma is in the appendix. Hendershott and Mendelson [18,
Proposition 3, p. 2081] prove the special case where αb = αs.
§2.3. Equilibrium
We assume traders are risk neutral and maximise expected payoff. In a Nash





1 if U(θ, αb, αs) > 0





1 if U(θ, αs, αb) > 0
0 if U(θ, αs, αb) < 0
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We now show that, in any Nash equilibrium, the same proportions of buyers and
sellers submit orders to the CN. Associated with each Nash equilibrium is therefore
a market share α∗ for the CN.
Lemma 2. In any Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model, αb = αs =: α
∗.
Proof. Suppose that different proportions of buyers and sellers submit orders to the
CN, for example, suppose αs < αb. Then their probabilities of order execution differ
as well. In fact, we have π(αb, αs) < π(αs, αb), so that
(1) U(θ, αb, αs) < U(θ, αs, αb).
Moreover, αs < αb implies αb > 0 and αs < 1. Now, in equilibrium traders would go
to the market with the highest payoff, so that αb > 0 and αs < 1 together would
imply U(θ, αb, αs) ≥ 0 and U(θ, αs, αb) ≤ 0. But that contradicts inequality (1). 
Having established that the same proportion α∗ of buyers and sellers submit orders
to the CN, we can turn to the question what determines the CN’s market share. As
it is ex ante uncertain which side of the market will be the long one, all traders face
some risk of being rationed if they go to the CN. After all, the numbers of buyers
and sellers of the asset are drawn independently, and thus the buy and sell sides of
the market are rarely exactly balanced. Therefore, the ex-ante probability of order
execution on the CN is bounded away from 1, even if all potential traders decide to
go to the CN.
For the geometric distribution of the number of traders, and market share α, the








where π(α) abbreviates π(α, α), the probability of order execution given market
share α with the equality of the function’s two arguments implicitly understood. The
function π(α) is increasing in α up to







For λ→∞, the probability of order execution converges to ln(2) ≈ 0.693, so that
π remains bounded away from 1. Thus, the CN is always riskier than the DM, at
which order execution is guaranteed.
If the disutility θ from an unexecuted order is large, even a small risk of an order
not being executed in the CN outweighs the difference in fees. The tipping point
is given by the θ̃ for which both market venues promise the same expected payoff,
provided that all traders go to the CN:
(2) θ̃ =























For tcn = 1, tdm = 2 and λ = 15, the upper limit of the multiplicity region is θ̃ = 3.953,
while π̄ = 0.6614.
Figure 1. Nash Equilibria of the benchmark model.
For liquidity preference θ > θ̃, the payoff on the DM exceeds the expected payoff in
the CN, even if all others traders coordinate to use the CN. In this case, submitting
orders to the DM is a dominant strategy and the market share of the CN is α∗ = 0.
Note that, under the geometric distribution, if λ→∞, the tipping point θ̃ converges
to the finite number (tdm − ln(2)tcn)/(1− ln(2)) and not to infinity. Thus, even when
the market is deep, a sufficiently large liquidity preference will induce traders to
trade on the DM. For tcn < θ < tdm, traders lose from trading on the DM and have
positive expected payoffs in the CN. In this case, trading in the CN is a dominant
strategy and α∗ = 1.
For intermediate values, tdm ≤ θ ≤ θ̃, there are three possible Nash equilibria.
In one Nash equilibrium, all traders go to the DM. A single trader cannot gain by
switching to the CN, because without a trading partner her order would not be
executed. In another Nash equilibrium, all traders go to the CN. If the CN attracts
sufficient liquidity, no trader has an incentive to leave the CN. Of these two equilibria,
coordination on the CN is the Pareto efficient equilibrium, because it maximises
expected payoff: π(θ − tcn) ≥ (θ − tdm), where the inequality follows from (2).
In addition to these pure Nash equilibria, there is a mixed equilibrium, in which
both markets co-exist. In this equilibrium, a proportion α̃(θ) ∈ (0, 1) of traders go
to the CN. Given the market share of the CN, the execution probability on the CN
equalises expected payoffs at both markets, so no trader wants to switch. Under the




















The next proposition summarises the possibilities. Figure 1 plots the equilibria of
the benchmark model with geometric distribution.
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Proposition 3. In any Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model, one of the following
three situations holds:
θ ∈ (tcn, tdm) and αb = αs = α∗ = 1,
θ ∈ [tdm, θ̃] and αb = αs = α∗ ∈ {0, α̃(θ), 1},
θ ∈ (θ̃,∞) and αb = αs = α∗ = 1.
The CN’s market share in the mixed equilibrium, α̃(θ), increases from 0 to 1 on the
interval [tdm, θ̃].
One may assume a selection process that is different from the geometric process. For
instance, the number of buyers Nb and sellers Ns may follow a Poisson distribution,
as in Myerson [24]; or the stochastic process may be chosen to reflect the propriety
rationing algorithm used by a particular crossing network (Degryse et al. [10] provide
an overview of algorithms used in practice). Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 and most
other results in the paper carry over if we impose some general properties on the order
execution probability π(·) at CN, all of which hold if traders are drawn according to
a geometric process.
π(αb, αs) is continuous and bounded away from 1;(3)
if αs < αb then π(αb, αs) < π(αs, αb);(4)
π(α) is an increasing function of α;(5)
π(αb, αs) = 0 if and only if αs = 0.(6)
Assumption (3) guarantees there is always some uncertainty about order execution
at the CN; (4) requires that, if the proportion of buyers that go to the CN exceeds
the number of sellers, the expected probability of execution of a buy order is smaller
than that of a sell order; (5) says that the probability of execution of an order is
increasing in the market share of the CN; and (6) that the probability of execution
of a buy order on the CN is zero if and only if there are no sellers that go to the CN.
No other properties were used for Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
3. A Model with Heterogeneous Liquidity Preferences
Which of the equilibria of the benchmark game should one expect in situations of
inter-market competition? In this section, we show that the multiplicity of equilibria
of the benchmark game hinges on the assumption of a liquidity preference θ that is
common to all traders. If liquidity preferences differ across traders, the market share
α∗ of the CN may be uniquely determined.
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§3.1. Private Liquidity Preferences
Suppose each trader i has a private liquidity preference θi. We assume that each θi
is the sum of two components: a common part θ, which may be interpreted as an
aggregate liquidity shock, and a private, idiosyncratic liquidity shock. More precisely
θi = θ + ν ui,
where ν is a scale parameter and each ui is drawn independently from a probability





The distribution f and scale factor ν are common knowledge, and each trader knows
her own preference θi. However, traders know the aggregate liquidity shock only up
to their private idiosyncratic shock ui. We assume traders’ prior with respect to the




≤ θL ≤ tdm− ν2 and θ̃+ ν2 ≤ θU . Finally, traders come to the market
according to a random process satisfying the properties described in Section 2.
This setup is an example of the “private value” global game approach in the spirit
of Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [12] and Morris and Shin [23], but with one important
difference. In global games, decisions of agents are typically strategic complements.
In our model, the decisions of buyers are complements to those of sellers (going to
the same markets increases the probability of order execution) but traders on the
same side of the market compete with each other for being matched in the CN and so
their choices are strategic substitutes instead of complements. As we will show, the
global-game approach may be generalised to this situation, establishing the existence
of a unique switching equilibrium for our model.
§3.2. Switching Equilibrium
Let as(θi) denote the proportion of sellers who submit to the CN when their private
liquidity preference is θi. The proportion of them who go to the CN when the













The proportion of buyers who go to the CN when the aggregate liquidity shock is θ,
denoted αb(θ, ab), is defined analogously. The relative payoff of going to the CN for
a buyer with liquidity preference θi is now:
(7) U(θi, αb, αs) = (θi − tcn)πe(θi, αb, αs)− (θi − tdm),
where the expected probability of order execution πe is given by













A switching equilibrium is a profile of strategies for sellers and buyers characterised
by two thresholds θ∗b , θ
∗
s , such that a buyer goes the CN if and only if her private
liquidity preference θi is smaller than the threshold value θ
∗
b and, likewise, a seller
goes to the CN if and only if her private liquidity preference θi is smaller than θ
∗
s ,
and such that no buyer or seller wants do deviate unilaterally.
Recall from Lemma 2 that all equilibria of the benchmark game are symmetric, in
the sense that the same proportions of buyers and sellers submit orders to the CN.
The key observation for our argument is that a modified version of this principle
must also be true in the private value game. More precisely, let us call a switching
equilibrium symmetric if buyers and sellers use the same thresholds, i.e. we have
θ∗b = θ
∗
s . In this case, for each θ, the proportion of buyers and sellers that go to the
same market is clearly identical. We now prove the following result:
Lemma 4. Any switching equilibrium is symmetric.
The logic is almost identical to that of Lemma 2. In equilibrium, buyers and sellers
must face the same probability of order execution, and this can happen only if the
proportions of buyers and sellers entering the CN are identical.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that there exists a switching equilibrium
such that θ∗s < θ
∗
b . Then for each θ, αs(θ) ≤ αb(θ), and this inequality holds strictly
in some neighbourhood N of θ∗b . By property (4), this implies π(αb(θ), αs(θ)) ≤
π(αs(θ), αb(θ)), where the inequality again holds strictly for θ ∈ N . But then
πe(θ∗b , αb, αs) ≤ πe(θ∗b , αs, αb), and hence U(θ∗b , αb, αs) < U(θ∗b , αs, αb).
In a switching equilibrium, buyers with liquidity preferences smaller than θ∗b must
weakly prefer the CN, while those with liquidity preferences greater than θ∗b must
weakly prefer the DM. Since expression (7) is continuous, this implies that buyers
with liquidity preference θ∗b are indifferent, so we have
0 = U(θ∗b , αb, αs) < U(θ
∗
b , αs, αb),
i.e. sellers strictly prefer the CN when their liquidity preference is θ∗b . But in a
switching equilibrium all sellers with liquidity preferences exceeding θ∗s must weakly
prefer the DM, so this contradicts that θ∗s < θ
∗
b can be thresholds in a switching
equilibrium. 
As a consequence of Lemma 4, a market share α∗ for the CN is associated with
each θ. It implies that traders’ decisions are complementary, even though the model
does not satisfy strategic complements. After all, the expected payoff for trader i of
going to the CN instead of the DM in expression (7) is increasing in the expected
probability of order execution in the CN. By property (5), for given θ this probability
is increasing in the amount of traders who direct their orders to the CN. Thus, for
each θ, the expected payoff of going to the CN is increasing in the market share of
the CN. For a fixed switching threshold θ∗ := θ∗b = θ
∗
s , the market share of the CN is
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decreasing in θ and then equation (8) implies that the expected payoff of going to
the CN is decreasing in the trader’s own liquidity preference θi.
We will now solve the game using arguments that are standard in the literature on





1 if θi ≤ x,
0 if θi > x,
x ∈ R.
A trader that uses this strategy goes to the CN if and only if her private liquidity
preference θi is smaller than x. Since U(θi, Ix, Ix) is continuous and, for fixed x,
decreasing in its first argument, a switching strategy around θ∗ is an equilibrium if
and only if U(θ∗, Iθ∗ , Iθ∗) = 0, viz. the trader with the critical liquidity preference θ∗
is indifferent.
Recall that when θi ≤ tdm, the payoff in the CN exceeds the payoff in the DM, even
if all other traders coordinate to use the CN. Similarly, when θi ≥ θ̃, the payoff of the
DM always exceeds that of the CN. By the intermediate value theorem, there is x
such that U(x, Ix, Ix) = 0, which guarantees the existence of a switching equilibrium.
If dU(x, Ix, Ix)/dx is strictly negative for each solution of U(x, Ix, Ix) = 0, then the
switching equilibrium is necessarily unique.
We may therefore conclude our argument by showing that dU(x, Ix, Ix)/dx < 0.
The partial derivative of U with respect to its first argument is strictly negative: an
increase in x increases expected return in the CN at a marginal rate that equals the
execution probability of order execution πe < 1, while expected returns on the DM
rise at a marginal rate of 1.
As for its other two arguments, an increase in the switching point up to which
traders use the CN affects the probabilities of order execution at any given fixed
θi. However, the key observation is: if buyers and sellers follow the strategy Ix, the
probability of order execution for the traders that have the critical liquidity preference
x must always be the same. The reason, pointed out by Morris and Shin (2003), is
that such a trader does not know whether she has a relatively high or a relatively
low liquidity preference since other traders’ liquidity preferences are independent
of her own, conditional on the aggregate liquidity shock. Indeed, Morris and Shin
showed that, conditional on having the threshold liquidity preference x, a trader’s
belief about the proportion of other traders who have a value of immediacy below
the threshold must be uniform on [0, 1]. Therefore an increase in x unambiguously
lowers the expected payoff U(x, Ix, Ix) at a rate 1− πe. There indeed exists a unique
solution to the equation U(x, Ix, Ix) = 0 and the next result follows immediately.
Proposition 5. There is a unique critical liquidity preference θ∗, such that in any
switching equilibrium, traders with private liquidity preferences θi smaller θ
∗ trade at
the CN, and those with liquidity preferences θi greater than θ






















π(α) dα is the expected probability of order execution for those traders
whose idiosyncratic liquidity preferences θi exactly equal θ
∗.
Note that θ∗ and π∗ do not depend on the distribution of signals f or scale factor ν.









In equilibrium, each trader weighs the expected payoff from trading at the CN against
the certain payoff from trading at the DM. At the switching threshold θ∗, these are
exactly equal. In case the CN captures part of the market, agents that have low
private liquidity preferences choose the CN and agents that have high private liquidity
preferences choose the DM. For an asset with average liquidity preference θ, the
market share of the CN is F ((1/ν)(θ∗ − θ)), where F is the cumulative distribution
of the idiosyncratic component in traders’ liquidity preferences. If θ < θ∗ − ν/2, all
traders have liquidity preferences smaller than θ∗ and choose to trade using the CN.
If θ > θ∗ + ν/2, all traders have preferences greater than θ∗ and trade on the DM.
For intermediate values of θ, the market share of the CN increases from 0 to 1—see
Figure 2.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium allows us to do comparative statics.
Corollary 6. The critical threshold θ∗ is increasing in tdm and decreasing in tcn.
This may be shown by differentiating equation (10). Thus, the CN and DM influence
their market share by setting the transaction costs appropriately.
The fact that trading venues attract different kinds of traders in the competition
for order flow explains a number of trends in which venues try to reduce the costs of
specific groups of traders. The fact that traders with high liquidity preferences are
more likely to trade on the CN draws liquidity from the DM. After all, these are the
14
traders that are most likely to post limit orders, providing liquidity to the market.
Nowadays, nearly all exchanges subsidise such liquidity providers.
Conversely, in 2009 the trading exchange BATS started to pay a subsidy to liquidity
takers who opt into routing their orders through BATS’ ATS partners [1]. Our model
allows us to see why. If an order can be matched on an ATS, it may be removed
from BATS’ order book, improving the ratio of liquidity providers to liquidity takers,
and thus liquidity, on the exchange. At the same time, an ATS benefits if liquidity
takers are encouraged to route their orders through it. Because of the existence
of network externalities, more orders on the CN increases expected payoff also for
other users of the CN, which makes the platform more attractive. Since individual
traders do not take this externality into account, it may make sense to provide a
subsidy. Alternatively, an ATS may compete for trades by offering services that are
not available on traditional exchanges, such as after hour-trading or anonymity.
The other key parameter that influences the equilibrium threshold is market liquidity.
To study its effects, we now turn back to the geometric distribution to investigate
the effect of the market thickness parameter λ on equilibrium. Note that π(α) is
increasing in λ for all α, so that π∗ also increases in λ. Thus, from equation (10) we
see:
Corollary 7. The critical threshold θ∗ is increasing in λ.
This tells us that at CNs assets are traded for which the expected turnover is large.
But, even for assets with the highest turnover, the disutility of order execution (and
hence, asset features leading to high average liquidity preferences, such as volatility)
is an important criterion for the allocation of order flow. This property of the
equilibrium limits the potentials for a CN to compete with a DM: if intervals before
crossings are extended to collect a larger number of orders (which raises λ), the
probability of order execution increases, which makes the CN more attractive. But,
the delay in the execution also increases expected costs. This limitation provides
a trade-off to any CN. In reality, CNs such as POSIT have reduced the length of
trading intervals only as overall liquidity has improved.
§3.4. Relation to standard global games results
The main insight to be gained from the model with heterogeneous liquidity preferences
is that some uncertainty about other traders’ private liquidity preferences are sufficient
to establish a unique switching equilibrium. Our argument requires uncertainty about
a trader’s own position in the distribution of preferences amongst the traders who are
active in the market. While this assumption is key in global games, it is also more
realistic than assuming common knowledge of the distribution of preferences amongst
active traders. By contrast, the common knowledge assumption is responsible for
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multiplicity of equilibria in the benchmark model. This mirrors similar findings in
the broader global games literature.
To conclude this section, we further clarify the relation between our results and
standard results on global games, which apply to games with strategic complements.
Let us assume for the moment that buyers and sellers always use the same strategy,
so that ab(θi) = as(θi) := a(θi) for all θi. Thus, equal proportions of buyers and
sellers go to the CN when their liquidity preference is θi. Given equal distributions
of liquidity preferences among buyers and sellers, the proportions of agents that go
to the CN when the true state is θ are also the same.
Now consider a modified game, in which agents choose to go to the CN or the
DM before they learn whether they will want to buy or sell the asset, so that the
strategies of buyers and sellers are indeed necessarily identical. The payoffs of going
to the DM instead of the CN are then given by:
(11) U(θi, α) = (θi − tcn)πe(θi, α, α)− (θi − tdm).
Since π(α) is increasing in α, it is straightforward to verify that this modified game
satisfies the usual strategic complements assumption from the global games literature.
Therefore, by standard results (e.g. Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [12]), this game has
a unique switching equilibrium.
We claim that a is an equilibrium of the modified game if and only if it is
a symmetric equilibrium of our original game. To see this, note that a is an
equilibrium in the modified game if and only if a(θi) > 0 ⇔ Uk(θi, α) ≥ 0 and
a(θi) < 1⇔ Uk(θi, α) ≤ 0 hold for each θi. But this is precisely the necessary and
sufficient condition for a symmetric equilibrium in the original game.
In sum, standard global game arguments guarantee the existence of a unique
symmetric switching equilibrium in the original game. In addition, Lemma 4 tells us
that there can be no other switching equilibria.
4. Welfare
In the benchmark model, concentration of trades in the CN is efficient whenever
θ < θ̃. With uncertainty, the efficient threshold is different. The difference arises
because (as shown in Subsection 2.3) a trader with liquidity preference θ̃ should go
to the CN only if all other traders do so. With dispersed preferences, a trader with
preference θ̃ must expect other traders to have a stronger preference for immediate
execution and thus choose the DM. Hence, she should also go to the DM.
This argument holds for preferences close to θ̃. The following proposition shows
that total expected payoffs to all traders would be maximised if they could coordinate
on trading at the CN up to a idiosyncratic liquidity preference k∗ that is smaller
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Results for tcn = 1, tdm = 2, ν = 1, and a truncated normal distribution with standard
deviation 1/4.
Figure 3. Equilibrium threshold θ∗ versus efficient threshold k∗
idiosyncratic noise. The proof involves chiefly algebraic manipulation and is in the
appendix).
Proposition 8. The strategy maximising expected total payoff to all traders in the
private value game is Ik∗, where
k∗ = θ̃ − ν π̄/2−K
(1− π̄) < θ̃,
and 0 ≤ K :=
∫ 1/2
−1/2 F (z)π(F (z)) dz < π/2.
If the equilibrium threshold θ∗ is smaller than k∗, the equilibrium is inefficient. As
our argument above relies on heterogeneous preferences, the deviation of k∗ from
θ̃ disappears for ν → 0, while the equilibrium threshold θ∗ is independent from
ν and bounded away from θ̃. Note that K depends on F , but not on ν. So, for
sufficiently small heterogeneity the equilibrium threshold is below the efficient one.
The inefficiency arises because the decision to go to the CN increases expected payoffs
also for other users of the CN due to network externalities, something that this is
not accounted for by individual decisions.
Proposition 8 does not depend on the assumption of a geometric arrival process.
But for a geometric distribution, the deviation of k∗ from θ̃ can be shown once more
to depend on the market liquidity λ. Figure 4 plots the efficient and the equilibrium
threshold for different values of λ when the idiosyncratic liquidity preferences are
given by a (truncated) normal distribution and under a geometric arrival process
process. For a uniform distribution of preferences, one can prove the equilibrium
threshold is always below the efficient one. As figure 4 shows, this also tends to hold
for other distributions and parameter values.
Although a large market does not guarantee order execution in the CN, it never-
theless reduces the risk of mis-coordination between buyers and sellers. Hence, the
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thicker a market, the higher is the liquidity preference at which traders are indifferent
in equilibrium. For λ→∞, the probability of order execution π(α) approaches ln(2)
for all α > 0. From Propositions 5 and 8 we now readily deduce:
Corollary 9. For the geometric distribution of market size the thresholds θ∗, k∗,
and tipping point θ̃ all converge to (tdm − ln(2)tcn)/(1− ln(2)) as λ→∞.
Proof. It suffices to note that limλ→∞K =
∫ 1/2
−1/2 F (z)πdz = π/2, since the graph of F
is point-symmetric in (0, 1
2
) due to the symmetry assumption on the distribution. 
As we have argued above, the probability of order execution is bounded away from
unity even for an arbitrarily large number of expected traders. For increasing λ, the
equilibrium switching point θ∗ (at which the heterogeneous traders are indifferent
between the CN and the DM in equilibrium) and the efficient threshold k∗ (at which
the DM is a dominating choice) are both increasing, and θ∗ catches up with the
efficient k∗.
This implies that for thick markets, the equilibrium of the private value game
approaches efficiency. Although a thick market does not guarantee order execution
in the CN, it provides a sufficient incentive to coordinate on the CN whenever this is
efficient. In the limit, the solution of the private value game also converges to the
upper bound of the region with multiple equilibria in the benchmark game.
5. Robustness
We have argued that in a CN, a larger volume of trades increases the probability
of order execution, which leads to network externalities. Several other features of
market intermediation lead to network externalities as well. In a traditional DM,
the market maker faces inventory risk that declines with the volume of trade and
thus allows her to lower trading costs and attract even more traders. In addition,
the costs of price discovery and the risk of exploitation by insiders are decreasing
in the proportion of orders that are directed to the same market venue. We now
argue that these features reinforce the assumptions needed for achieving a unique
switching equilibrium. We also discuss the robustness of our results to a situation
where there are different kinds of traders, and to the uniform prior assumption.
§5.1. Endogenous Trading Costs
We assumed transaction fees at both markets to be set exogenously. In reality, costs
to operate a CN are overhead and fees should be falling in the number of trades.
Similarly, for a DM, the bid ask spread can be lower if more traders use this market.
Reasons are, besides overhead costs, decreasing expected inventory per trade, lower
costs of price discovery, and a lower risk of exploitation by insiders. As orders carry
information used for price discovery, a dealer’s bid-ask spread is generally decreasing
18
in trading volume. These features strengthen the strategic complements driving our
results on the allocation of order flow. To see this, suppose that tcn(α) is a decreasing
function of the CN’s market share α and tdm(α) is increasing in α. The arguments
in Section 3 concerning strategic complements carry through.
A more technical requirement for the argument in Section 3 is the existence of
dominance regions. If tcn(0) < tdm(1), the lower dominance region exists. This
assumption can be justified by assuming that a CN cross-subsidises dry markets
by revenues from markets in which it is already established or reduces fees below
average costs in the introduction phase as an advertisement.
On the other hand, the DM will never charge an infinite fee, even if it has almost
no customers. Traded assets have an inherent value and dealers may also use the CN
to relieve themselves of involuntary inventory. Hence, the upper dominance region
should exist as well.
§5.2. Price Discovery
Typically, electronic markets are first established as CNs and market orders are
carried out at a price derived from traditional markets. Once established, many CNs
expand by allowing limit orders and introduce their own price discovery. Then, they
are classified as Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). The submission of a
limit order with a low limit greatly reduces the risk of an order not being executed.
Therefore, going to an ECN would seem to become a dominant strategy for all
traders, no matter how urgent their orders are, provided that transaction costs on
the ECN are sufficiently low compared to the DM. However, price discovery done by
dealers is more than just equalising supply and demand.
Dealers try to smooth prices over time by taking inventory. They also respond to
indications of inside-trading. A low trading volume and uncertain prospects of the
underlying asset are more likely leading to volatile prices in an ATS than in a DM.
Traders who know the fair price may submit limit orders to an ECN but their orders
might not be executed if the current price happens to be beyond their limit due to
volatility. Hence, risk averse traders still have an incentive to choose the DM for
trading such assets. At a DM, prices are more stable and orders are always executed.
Smoothing prices is a service that is valuable to customers, as is immediate order
execution. DMs provide both services, while pure electronic markets can provide only
one of the two. CNs provide smooth prices taken from the DM, electronic markets
with price discovery provide almost certain order execution instead. For a trader,
the trade-off between an ECN and a DM is similar to the trade-off between a CN
and a DM. For traders with a low preference for the service of price-smoothing, the
ECN is a dominant strategy, while traders with a high preference for smooth prices
better choose the DM. Strategic complements arises from the fact that both market
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Results for λ = 15, tcn = 1, tdm = 2, and ξ1 = ξ2 =
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dm = 0. Both
groups switch at θ ≈ 3.32.








dm = 0. Group
1 traders switch at θ ≈ 2.43 and group 2 traders switch at θ ≈ 3.14.
Figure 4. Symmetric switching equilibrium with different kinds of traders
game approach can be applied in a similar way to the competition between an ECNs
and DMs, though modelling the details will admittedly be more difficult.
These arguments also explain an empirical difference between the US and Europe.
In the US, traditional markets operate as DMs and face competition by ATSs with
price discovery, while in Europe, most stock exchanges are organised as auctions and
do not take inventory. They face more competition from cheaper CNs (Degryse and
Van Achter [8]).
§5.3. Different kinds of traders
Proposition 5 implies dealer markets may coexist with crossing networks when traders’
liquidity preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous. In this subsection, we discuss a
variant of this result that holds when there are other sources of heterogeneity among
traders. For instance, some may be large institutional traders for whom revealing
trades is costly and who value anonymity. That makes trading on a CN relatively
more attractive for them.
Suppose there are m > 0 groups of traders with relative proportions ξk ∈ Q+,
(k = 1, 2, . . . ,m) summing to unity. Trader i from group k has utility function:
Uk(θi, αb, αs) = (θi − δkcn − tcn)πe(θi, αb, αs)− (θi − δkdm − tdm),
where δkcn and δ
k
dm are group-specific parameters affecting a group’s preferences over
the crossing network and the dealer market, and θi is an idiosyncratic liquidity
preference, as before.
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We have the following equilibrium existence result, as well as a characterisation
result for small noise. For G ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, define:









θi − δkdm − tdm





π(x) dx. Then the following holds:3
Proposition 10. This game has a unique symmetric switching equilibrium; as ν → 0,
the groups of traders that go to the CN are determined point-wise as arg maxG P (θ,G).
Thus, to find the (unique) symmetric threshold equilibrium, one may maximise P .
We prove the proposition in the appendix, exploiting a known link between global
games and the potential games of Monderer and Shapley [21]. Maximising P is a
relatively tractable problem in practice. For example, Figure 4 plots the switching
equilibrium of a game with heterogeneous traders under two different assumptions for
the group-specific parameters. Note how in the extended model with heterogeneous
traders, the DM and CN may now coexist even if the noise scale ν that affects their
liquidity preferences becomes small.
Furthermore, note that the expression for θ∗ in Proposition 5 is a special case of the
solution in stated in Proposition 10 with m = ξ1 = 1 and δ1cn = δ
1
dm = 0. In fact, the
equilibria in the extended model share the property that the equilibrium thresholds
are bounded away from θ̃. Therefore, variants of the welfare results reported in
Section 4 will also hold.
§5.4. Non-Financial Markets
Our results carry over to non-financial markets, provided that traders’ size and the
distribution of their liquidity preferences is the same on both sides of the market,
and information is symmetric among all traders. Electronic matching markets
can attract order flow away from traditional dealer markets, if they offer features
that make them a dominant strategy for some traders on both sides of the market.
The symmetry assumptions hold for some business to business markets (such as
commodities markets) but not for markets in which larger intermediaries trade with
smaller retail shops or for retailers dealing with consumers (such as amazon.com).
§5.5. Non-uniform prior distributions
Our results, particularly Proposition 5 on the uniqueness of the switching equilibrium
for any ν > 0, assume that traders have a uniform prior on the support [θL, θH ]
of the aggregate liquidity shock θ. To conclude our paper, we briefly discuss the
3Unfortunately we have not been able to prove the counterpart of Lemma 4 for this setting. Thus,
while a unique symmetric switching equilibrium exists, we are not sure that there are no other
equilibria.
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robustness of our results with respect to this assumption, building on known results
from the global games literature.
A sufficient condition for the existence of a switching equilibrium is that a higher
liquidity preference leads a trader to shift up his posterior beliefs about the aggregate
liquidity shock. Following Guimarães and Morris [17], say that the noise structure
in the private value game satisfies first order stochastic dominance if, given a prior




φ(x)f(θi − x) dx
/∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x)f(θi − x) dx,
is decreasing in θi for each value of θ. If this condition holds, the expected order
execution probability (8), which may be written as
πe(θi, αb, αs) =
∫
θ
π (αb(θ, ab), αs(θ, as)) dH(θ|θi),
is increasing for any switching strategy. Hence, the existence of a switching equilib-
rium may be established by arguments analogous to that in Section 3. Uniqueness
is guaranteed with any prior if φ is smooth and the heterogeneity in idiosyncratic
preferences, as measured by ν, becomes small. Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [12]
show that the noise structure of the game then converges to that of a game with a
uniform prior.4
6. Conclusion
The emergence of alternative trading systems such as CNs increases inter-market
competition for order flow. While increased competition may be welcomed from
the perspective of market and price efficiency, the greater choice of trading venues
fragments order flow and reduces liquidity and transparency, which are key to the
functioning of financial markets. Hence, it is important to know under what conditions
CNs may emerge as alternative trading systems. In this paper we presented a model
building on the idea that the allocation of order flow between DMs and a CN may
be understood as a game with network externalities.
The main achievement of our model is the removal of the multiplicity of equilibria
in the allocation of order flow that has plagued previous models in the literature
with similar features. We proved the existence of a unique switching equilibrium if
traders have heterogeneous preferences about the value of immediate order execution.
Our argument requires that traders face some uncertainty about their own posi-
tions in the distribution of everyone’s preferences. That is key for applying global
games techniques, but also more realistic than assuming common knowledge of the
distribution of preferences amongst active traders.
4See Lemma A2 in [12]. This is a result solely about the noise structure of a global game, and
applies to our game which has a similar noise structure, even though has payoff functions that do
not satisfy the usual global game assumptions.
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In contrast to models with multiple equilibria, our analysis provides some definitive
answers to the question under which conditions a CN can co-exist with a dealer
market. For instance, if disutility from unexecuted orders arise due to price volatility,
our model shows that orders for trading assets with low price volatility and large
turnovers are initially submitted to a CN, while assets with high volatility or small
volumes are exclusively traded on dealer markets. The main advantage of a CN are
low transaction costs. Part of the service provided by a dealer may be understood
as an insurance against buyer-seller mis-coordination. Therefore, traders with a
preference for fast order execution prefer trading on a DM even at higher costs.
The properties of the equilibrium shed light on developments that redirect order
flow away from traditional exchanges. A new trading venue could offer a service or a
cost advantage that attracts some traders independent of the size of the new trading
venue. Examples of services that have emerged in reality are after hour-trading,
anonymity, and subsidised rerouting of orders on exchanges to ATS partners. This
guarantees a lower bound on liquidity.
In Europe, CNs have been established mainly by brokers, who circumvent tradi-
tional exchanges by matching their customers’ orders in-house at cheaper costs, if
possible. They use traditional exchanges only for excess orders. In the US, traditional
dealer markets are less automated and price discovery takes explicit account of poten-
tial orders by insiders. Here, ECNs have been the most successful alternative trading
systems. Still, the allocation of order flow follows a similar pattern: traditional
dealers provide a partial insurance against exploitation of liquidity traders by insiders,
where transaction prices at ECNs do not provide this service.5 Liquidity traders may
or may not find it worthwhile to pay a premium for this insurance, depending on
their preferences.
By offering lower trading costs or special services that make a new market venue
attractive for some customers even with low liquidity, a venue may create the minimal
momentum required to attract further customers. If this is given, the new venue can
gain an even larger market share, because as liquidity increases, the venue attracts
more and more traders who would otherwise prefer the established intermediary.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For a buyer on the CN, the number of additional buyers k has a
geometric distribution with E(k) = αb λ. The probability of having k other buyers
on this market is
pb(k) =
1
1 + αb λ
(
αb λ
1 + αb λ
)k
.
5Empirical evidence for this view is provided by Venkataraman [30].
23
The probability of having r sellers is
ps(r) =
1
1 + αs λ
(
αs λ
1 + αs λ
)r
.
The probability of execution of a buyer’s order, given that there are k other buyers





if r ≤ k
1 if r > k.
The conditional probability of order execution, given that there are k other buyers, is
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we find that
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.
The execution probability for sell orders is calculated by interchanging the subscripts
b and s. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Given a switching strategy around k, the unconditional ex-







π(αs(θ, Ik))(θ + νui − tcn) dθ +
∫ θH
k−νui
θ + νui − tdm dθdF (ui) .
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π (F (z)) dzdx,
where we have used changes of variables in the last two lines. Solve for a zero to find













π (F (z)) dzdx
]
.
By Fubini’s theorem, we may change the order of integration for the double integral—
denoted K in the statement of our proposition—so that
∫∫
D
π (F (z)) dzdx =
∫∫
D







π (F (z)) dxdz,
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where we used that the two-dimensional domain of integration can be written as
D := {(x, z) ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and − 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
2
and z ≥ F−1(x)}
= {(x, z) ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and − 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
2
and x ≤ F (z)}.





F (z)π(F (z)) dz. Finally, to see that
the inequality on K in the proposition holds, note that π(α) < π for almost all α.





F (z) dz = 1
2
π, where the fact that the
integral evaluates to 1
2




Proof of Proposition 10. As in Subsection 3.4, consider a modified game, Γ, in which
agents choose to go to the CN or the DM before they learn whether they will want to
buy or sell the asset, so that strategies of buyers and sellers are identical. Formally,
let ak be the proportion of buyers and sellers of group k that go to the CN when their
liquidity preference is θi. Then α
k
b (θ) = α
k
s(θ) := α
k(θ) for all k and all θ. For the
purpose of this proof, we will relabel the liquidity preferences by defining ηi = −θi;
nothing substantial hinges on this labelling.6 Denoting the aggregate proportion of
traders going to the CN by α, payoffs for group k-traders are then given by
(13) Uk(ηi, α) = (ηi + δk + tdm)− (ηi + δk + tcn)πe(−ηi, α, α)
By Lemma A1 in Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [12], for any ν, this modified game
has an essentially unique, monotonic switching equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for
each η, all traders in the same group choose the same venue: ak(θ) ∈ {0, 1} for all k
and all θ. We may therefore describe the equilibrium aν(η) := (a1(η), . . . , am(η)) as
a profile of step functions indicating the proportion (0 or 1) of traders that go to the
CN for each value of η. By virtue of our relabelling of θ, each ak(η) is an increasing
function; for fixed η, the profile aν(η) gives a coordinate (in fact, a corner) in the
m-dimensional unit cube. Following the argument in Subsection 3.4, this equilibrium
is the sole symmetric switching equilibrium of the generalised game with different
groups of traders. This proves the first part of the proposition.
We will characterise the limiting switching equilibrium profile a obtained when
ν → 0. Identify the subsets G ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with the corners of the m-dimensional
unit cube and extend P as follows to the unit cube:








η + δkdm + tdm
η + δkcn + tcn
.
As a key step, we will approximate the modified game using a series of finite player
games. Let ` be the least common denominator of ξ1, . . . , ξm. For each n ∈ N, let Γn
be the finite `n-player global game with payoff functions as in (13). Since the number
6The relabelling is convenient, because it allows us to apply standard global game results that deal
with monotonically increasing strategy profiles.
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of players is a multiple of `, the fractions α and α1, . . . , αk are still well defined for
any action profile and any η. Again by Lemma A1 in [12], for each ν > 0, each game
Γn has an essentially unique, increasing switching equilibrium anν , in which for each
η, all traders in the same group choose the same venue. Thus, each anν(η) must be
a corner of the m-dimensional unit cube. We now justify our approximation of Γ
by the games Γn by proving the following claim. It states that, for any ν > 0, the
equilibria anν of the games Γn converge to the equilibrium aν of Γ.
Claim 1. For each ν > 0, anν → aν pointwise as n→∞.
Fix some ν > 0 and consider the sequence of equilibria {anν}n∈N. As the (“Helly”)
space of increasing functions is sequentially compact (see [27], example 107), we may
assume this sequence converges to a limit aν . By the dominated convergence theorem,
expectations under the utility functions Uk converge along the sequence {anν}n∈N,
so for each η, aν(η) is a joint best reply to aν . Therefore aν is an equilibrium of Γ.
By the essential uniqueness of aν , we must have aν = aν , proving our claim.
Next, note that, for fixed η, the derived complete information game given by payoffs
UCk (η, α) := (η + δk + tdm)− (η + δ + tcn)π(α)
is a potential game with potential function











η + δkdm + tdm
η + δkcn + tcn
.
By Theorem 4 in [12], if (for fixed η) the action profile an ∈ arg max P̃ n(η, α1, . . . , αk),
then anν(η) = an for sufficiently small ν. We claim that P̃ n relates to P̃ as follows:
Claim 2. For large n, arg max P̃ n(η, α1, . . . , αk) ⊆ arg max P̃ (η, α1, . . . , αk).
Consider the sequence {an}. Without loss of generality we may assume this sequence
converges to some a∗. We claim that a∗ ∈ arg max P̃ (η, α1, . . . , αk). For suppose this
is not the case. Then there is α∗∗ such that P̃ (η, α∗∗) > P̃ (η, a∗)+d and consequently,
by the continuity of P̃ , there are neighbourhoods N ∗ of a∗ and N ∗∗ of α∗∗ such that
P̃ (η, x)− d/4 > P̃ (η, y) + d/4 for each x ∈ N ∗∗ and y ∈ N ∗. Since our assumptions
on π imply it is Riemann integrable, for each point z, P̃ n(η, z)→ P̃ (η, z) as n→∞
(by the definition of the Riemann integral). We may choose n sufficiently large so
that the following holds: an ∈ N ∗; there is at least one point z of the action space of
Γn in N ∗∗; and P̃ n(η, z) and P̃ n(η, an) are within d/4 of P̃ (η, z) and P̃ (η, a∗). Then
P̃ n(η, an) ≥ P̃ n(η, z) > P̃ (η, z)− d/4 > P̃ (η, a∗) + (d/4) > P̃ n(η, an),
but that is a contradiction. This proves our claim.
We are now ready to characterise the limiting switching equilibrium profile a of the
game Γ, obtained when ν → 0. It suffices to characterise a at all but finitely many
points. Let D0 be the (finite) set of discontinuities of a, D1 be the (finite) set of
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points at which maxP (η, ·) (which is increasing in η) is not uniquely defined, and
D = D0 ∪ D1. Fix some η∗ /∈ D. We will prove the proposition by showing that





aνn(η∗) = a∗ ∈ arg maxP and lim
n→∞
aνn(η∗) = aν(η∗).











anν(η∗) = a∗ ∈ arg maxP.
By the Moore-Osgood theorem, a sufficient condition is that the first limit in (14)
converges uniformly. Thus we will show:
Claim 3. There are n ∈ N and ν > 0 such that for all n > n and all 0 < ν ≤ ν, we
have anν(η∗) = an, where an is the greatest element in arg max P̃ n(η∗, α1, . . . , αk).
We will prove this using methods in Basteck, Daniëls and Heinemann [2].
Since, for each ν, aν(η) converges to a(η) for each η, and for each ν, aν is a profile
of increasing functions taking on only finitely many values, there is some ν > 0 such
that, for all 0 < ν ≤ ν, and all η in a 8νm-neighbourhood of η∗, aν(η) = a(η∗).
Similarly, we may choose n such that an(η∗ − 4νm) = an(η∗ + 4νm) and constant
in-between. Now fix some n and some ν satisfying the hypothesis of our claim. Given
some fixed η∗∗ that we will choose below, introduce the binary action game e with
the same players as Γ, but payoffs7




−1 if xi < η∗∗,
Uk(α, η
∗∗) if xi ≥ η∗∗.
,
and Ũk(0, α, xi) = 0 (we identify action 1 with going to the CN and action 0 with
going to the DM). Compared with the global game Γn, the distribution of individual
signals remains unchanged. We assume an improper uniform prior, so the posterior
beliefs in e are well defined and take the same form as in [2] and in Γn.
Now suppose an > anν(η∗) (in the pointwise ordering). Set η∗∗ = η − 2νm. By
Theorem 2 in [2], in the game e, there exists an equilibrium strategy profile y such that
y(x) = an for x ≥ η∗ − νm. Now consider the strategy profile a = max(anν , y). Due
to strategic complements and the fact that Uk is monotonic in η, an upper best reply
iteration in Γn starting from a must lead upwards and converge to some equilibrium
of Γ. Moreover, a(η) ≥ an > anν(η∗) for η > η∗ − νm. Yet this contradicts the
uniqueness of the equilibrium anν in Γn. So conclude an 6> anν(η∗).
Next, we prove an ≥ anν(η∗). Consider anν . We know this equilibrium profile is
increasing, so (since is has at most m jumps), 3νm-near to η∗ there must be some
point η∗∗ > η∗ such that anν is constant in a 2νm neighbourhood of η∗∗. We will shift
avn to the right by ∆ = η∗∗− η∗, bound the resulting strategy profile by aνn(η∗∗) and
consider it as a strategy profile in e. To this end, let y(x) = min{anν(x−∆), anν(η∗∗)}.
7We use a slight relabelling of e compared with Basteck et al. [2], who take η∗ = 0 and ν = 1.
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Due to strategic complements, and Ũk being monotonic in θ, a best reply iteration
in e starting from y must lead upwards and converge to some equilibrium where
y(x) ≥ anν(η∗∗) for some x. By Theorem 2 in [2], this implies an ≥ anν(η∗∗), and we
know anν(η∗∗) ≥ anν(η∗). Thus, our claim is proved. 
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